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DICKINSON LAW' REVIEW

about the terre-tenant whose deed is not recorded. Presumably revival between
the original parties will continue the lien for five years against the land conveyed.
Prior to November 28th, 1943, (within six months from the enactment of the
act) judgments may be revived as to terre-tenants whose deeds had not been
recorded for five years, unless the five-year period expired within the six months,
in which case revival has to be had before the expiration of the five-year period.
The act says nothing about possession giving the same constructive notice as
recording of the deed but section 2 does require service of the sci. fa. on all persons
occupying the real estate.
It was held in Farmers N. B. & T. Co. v. Barrett, 321 Pa. 273, that the creditor
has five years from the recording of the terre-tenant's deed to revive as against him
and that he need not be.joined in a sci. fa. against the judgment debtor but may be
served with a second sci. fa. on the original judgment at any time within the five-year
period from the date his deed was recorded, even though his deed was on record
when the first sci. fa. was issued.
It was evidently the legislative purpose to change this rule and to enable a
terre-tenant, whose deed is on record when a judgment is revived, to feel that his
land will be free from the lien of the judgment, if he is not made a party to the
original sci. fa.
A judgment is now a lien for only five years, not only as to land of the debtor
but also as to land conveyed subject to the lien of the judgnment, if the terre-tenant
puts his deed on record. Revival before recording or taking possession will extend
the lien for five years from the date of the judgment of revival.

THE DUTY OF AN INSURER TO ACT
PROMPTLY ON APPLICATION
This problem of whether or not a duty rests upon an insurer to act promptly
upon application, although not arising too frequently, does come into the limelight
in certain types of insurance, where the agent is not authorized to complete the
contract, and where the contract is not completed prior to the decease of the insured.
In many types of insurance one deals solely with an authorized agent who is
authorized to complete the contract. But in other types the agent is authorized
only to transmit the application to the home office of the company. It is in these
latter cases where through carelessness or some other factor, a delay has been
caused in the deliyery of the policy, that our question becomes one of importance.
To better understand our problem, let us look at the following hypothetical case:
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"A goes to B, an agent of X Life Insurance Company to take out a
health and accident policy. B is not authorized to consummate the
contract, but only to transfer the application to the main office of the
company. A pays his first premium, and B sends the policy to its
destination. But due to B's negligence, the policy travels to 3 or 4
different offices before reaching the main office. During all of this
time A has somewhat of an understanding that he is insured. And
then something happens to A, prior to the final issuing of the policy.
A now sues the Company on the policy."
It is easy for one to see why A, in the above case would be justified in feeling
that the company was liable. Anyone in his place would feel that he would have
been reimbursed if there had been no delay and therefore why should he, the applicant, be made to suffer the loss.
In the remainder of this article, your author will bring forth the history of
this problem, including the most outstanding cases in some of the various states
dealing therewith. Furthermore, he will discuss the latest Pennsylvania case on
point and show why it should not be followed in the future. But let us first turn
to the history of our problem.
In the early cases the applicant brought action against the company in contract
on the theory that the long silence of the insurance company constituted an acceptance of the offer contained in his application, or that from the silence the law would
presume an acceptance. Actions brought on these theories met with little success.
Many lower courts, basing their decisions upon the weight of equities and not upon
the sound principles of law, held the insurance companies liable to said applicants.
But on appeal, these decisions would be definitely overruled. The rules on this
view are set out by Prof. Vance in his book on Insurance, as follows:
"Tfie mere delay of the insurer, however unreasonable, in acting upon
an application for insurance, raises no implication of its acceptance.
Nor does such delay estop thL insurer from denying the existence of
the contract. This rule is sound in principle, as the application is a
.mere offer which requires some overt act of acceptance by the insurer
to change it into a contract. It is also supported by the great weight
of authority."
It is important to notice, at this stage in the history, the marked tendency of
the courts in desiring to allow recovery. This tendency may be shown by the fact
that many courts of original jurisdiction so held, and also by the fact that the
justices of the upper courts, although denying recovery, suggest that the insurance
company might be liable in some other form of action.
Finally one plaintiff adopted a new course. In 1897 in the case of Carter v.
Manhaitan Life Insurance Company1 the plaintiff brought an action in tort against
,.Carter v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company, 11 Hawaiian Reports 69.
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the company and obtained a verdict. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal.
The court held that the agent of the defendant was under a non-contractual duty
to forward the application promptly, and that for his breach of duty the company
was liable. This decision excited very little comment. The reason for this is aptly
expressed by Professor Vance at Page 190 in his book:
"Probably because the report of this case was not generally available
to the bar of the United States, it seems not to have made any impression upon the American cases."
For the next fifteen years, the unsuccessful applicants continued bringing
their actions in contract and were continuously defeated. Then when a suit was2
brought in tort, this case was neither argued by counsel nor cited by the court
The case that really marks the beginning of the doctrine that an insurance
company is liable in tort for the carelessness of its agents in forwarding the appli-

cation is that of Boyer v. State Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company.3 Here

an agent held the plaintiff's application for hail insurance three days before he forwarded it, with the result that when the plaintiff's crops were destroyed, no policy
had been issued. The trial court found for the plaintiff and this was affirmed upon
appeal by Judge Burch. But the opinion in this case made little effort to explain
the novel doctrine. It states:
"There was sufficient danger to the plaintiff to be apprehended from
delay in closing the transaction that a reasonably prudent business
man, guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate conduct,
would have acted with diligence."
This opinion in no way reveals the reasons for its holding and therefore in
and of itself is not a holding on which one may confidentially rely. Judge Burch
assumed many of the points to be proved. Therefore this case cannot be considered
as an important milestone in the history of our problem.
Perhaps the greatest milestone in the history of this problem, and the case
which is in accord with the weight of authority at thL present time is Duffie v.
Bankers' Life Association.4 The opinion in this case by Judge Ladd of the Supreme
Court of Iowa was much more thoroughly reasoned and more conclusive than that
rendered in the Boyer case, supra. In this case the evidence clearly established that
the applicant was in sound health and otherwise an acceptable risk. He had paid
the first premium and done all other things required of him before issuance of the
policy. The application, however, was negligently mislaid by the insurer's agent
and not sent forward until the accidental death of the applicant some thirty days
2

.Upon reading the Hawaiian case it is to be noted that the court relied solely upon the dicta
in the following cases: Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Insurance Company, 102 Cal. 218; Trask v.
German Insurance Company, 53 Mo. App. 625; and also upon two other cases, one in New York and
one in3 Iowa.
.Boyer v. State Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company, 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912).
4.Duffie v. Bankers' Life Association, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087.
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after the date of the application. An action in tort was brought by the applicant's
widow, suing as beneficiary designated in the application, and alleging that by the
negligence of the insurer she had been deprived of the insurance policy that would
otherwise have been issued in due course. As administratrix she also filed a
petition of intervention. The lower court directed a verdict for the defendant in
both proceedings. In the Supreme Court the judgment entered was affirmed as
to plaintiff's action as beneficiary, but reversed as to her petition as administratrix.
The reason for the above holding may best be given in the words of Ladd J. 139
N. W. 1087 at 1089"But it is said that a certificate or policy of insurance is simply a contract like any other, as between individuals, and that there is no such
thing as negligence of a party in the matter of delay in entering into
a contract. This view overlooks the fact that the defendant holds and
is acting under a franchise from the state. The legislative policy, in
granting this, proceeds on the theory that chartering such association
is in the interest of the public to the end that indemnity on specific
contingencies shall be provided those who are eligible and desire it,
and for their protection the state regulates, inspects and supervises their
business. Having solicited applications for insurance, and having so
obtained them and received payment of the fees or premiums exacted,
they are bound either to furnish the indemnity the state has authorized
them to furnish or decline so to do within such reasonable time as will
enable them to act intelligently and advisedly thereon or suffer the
consequences flowing from their neglect so to do. Otherwise the
applicant is unduly delayed in obtaining the insurance he desires, and
for which the law has afforded the opportunity, and which the insurer
impliedly has promised, if conditions are satisfactory. Moreover,
policies of insurance ordinarily are dated as of the day the application
is signed, and, aside from other considerations, the insurer should not
be permitted to unduly prolong the period for which it is exacting
the payment of premiums without incurring risk."
In the above quotation it is clearly shown that the court adopted the view that
the company was under a duty to act promptly because it held a franchise from
the state. This argument is somewhat rebutted by the fact that many other classes
of corporations are chartered but it does not follow that the same duty rests upon
them; but then this latter argument may also be refuted by pointing out the peculiar
structure and organization of an insurance company, in comparision with these other
corporations.
Since the Duffie case, there have been other decisions in many other states
criticising the holding for various reasons, but in the final outcome the courts find
themselves in accord. Therefore, it can be said that the majority of the states are
in accord with the Duffie case.
In 1940, almost 20 years later, a case presenting the same problem arose in
Pennsylvania, and recovery was denied. This was the case of Zayc, Admr. v. John
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Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston.5 The facts of this case are
as follows: The applicant applied for a 20 payment life insurance policy of
$12,000 with a double indemnity provision, on June 25, 1931 and paid $4.00
on the first premium. Due to this application, the applicant did not attempt to
take out a policy with any other company. The defendant company, for no apparent
reason, failed either to accept or to reject the policy by August 25, 1931, the date
on which the applicant was accidentally killed: and did not thereafter offer to
return his four dollar deposit. The applicant's administrator then sued in trespass,
alleging that by reason of the negligence of the defendant company in failing to
advise the applicant within a reasonable time that a policy would or would not be
issued, he was deprived-of life insurance protection which he otherwise would have
bad.
The lower court held for the defendant and upon appeal, this decision was
affirmed. The opinion, rendered by Mr. Justice Patterson was to the effect that:
"The neglect or unreasonable delay of an insurance company in acting
upon an application for insurance is not tortious, and a trespass action
cannotbe based upon it because the law places no affirmative duty on
an insurance company to act upon an application for insurance within
a reasonable time."
A well-written criticism of this opinion is a case note in the Dickinson Law
Review.6 This criticism is to the effect that the court, in establishing the lack of
duty, refuses to inspect the equities which the facts of the case present, and which
are the primary bases for finding a duty in the pioneering cases. Instead the court
tries to show why similar cases in other jurisdictions, oppositely decided such as
the Duffie and Boyer cases, are wrong. The main point in this criticism is brought
out in the following quotation:
"Further, though discussing a tort liability, the court makes the following conclusion"-then the writer quotes from the opinion a paragraph to the effect that no contract was formed, and then he continues:
"In a suit begun purely on a tort basis, the law of contracts should not
be allowed to preclude the possibility of negligence, and a duty should
be placed upon the defendant if the facts indicate the risk of its action
damaging someone far exceeded the utility of its conduct .......
It would seem that the court reached an erroneous result in the present
case because it ..... .. assumed that no duty existed and attempted
to justify this decision on contract rather than tort principles."
This law review article also brings out another point upon which the answer
to this whole problem should be based. That is the point of weighing risk against
utility.
5.Zayc, Admr. v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston, 338 Pa. 426,

13 A. (2nd). 34.

6.46 Dickinson Law Review 205 (1942).
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In the Restatement of Torts, sec. 298, comment "a" it is stated: "As in all
cases where the reasonable character of the actor's conduct is in question, its utility
is a matter to be weighed against the magnitude of the risk which it involves."
If the courts in all cases in which this problem has arisen, would use this test,
a fairer result would have been reached. It is very apparent that there is no utility
in the defendant's delay, and that the risk which is presented has much weight.
Therefore this Pennsylvania case would have been decided differently, had the
above test been used.
The history of this problem from the beginning down to the most recent
Pennsylvania case, including the most important cases on point which have been
the stepping stones in the development of this history, convinces the writer that
a duty does rest upon an insurer to answer an application. A quotation from an
article by C. W. Funk in the Pennsylvania Law Review" to be found in Goble's
"Cases on Insurance" at page 55 written in 1927, prior to the Zayc case, which
shows the early tendency, even in Pennsylvania, to impose this duty upon an insurer,
concludes this article.
"Considering the problem purely on its merits, it is submitted that the
rule announced by the Duffie Case is a desirable one. Insurance has
come to play such an extensive part in our civilization that the business
is recognized as being quasi-public in character; and the insurance
contract is treated by the courts in a way different from ordinary agreements. It (the insurer) is seldom subjected to greater liability than
it would have incurred had it functioned properly and accepted the
roposal. To allow it to benefit as the result of its carelessness, which
as so greatly harmed the applicant, seems offensive to all theories
of justice . . . It is believed, however, that when the question is
presented before the appellate tribunals of the various states of this
country which have not yet considered it, the majority of them will
be sufficiently influenced by the considerations which have been mentioned to decide that the insurer must be responsible for the loss which
the applicant incurred."
HAROLD

775 U. of Pa. Law Review 207, 222.
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